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Abstract
Using U.S. Census microdata, we show that, on average, workers change occupation and industry less
in more densely populated areas. The result is robust to standard demographic controls, as well as
to including aggregate measures of human capital and sectoral mix. Analysis of the displaced worker
surveys shows that this effect is present in cases of involuntary separation as well. On the other hand, we
actually ﬁnd the opposite result (higher rates of occupational and industrial switching) for the subsample
of younger workers. These results provide evidence in favor of increasing-returns-to-scale matching
in labor markets. Results from a back-of-the-envelope calibration suggest that this mechanism has an
important role in raising both wages and returns to experience in denser areas.
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11 Introduction
Workers in more densely populated areas, on average, earn higher wages. It almost has to be this way to
compensate for the higher costs of living arising from congestion. But businesses have to pay these higher
wages, on top of facing the same costs of congestion. Why then would ﬁrms choose to locate in dense areas,
given these disadvantages? Evidently being in highly populated areas brings some productivity advantage
that compensates for the higher cost structure. A typical ﬁrst hypothesis is that densely populated areas
enjoy some natural locational advantage, such as being a convenient transportation node (New York and
Chicago, for example). While this seems a compelling hypothesis for the days when transportation was
supremely costly, it is less so following the decline in transport costs and the rise of the service economy.
And yet, these great agglomerations of people and enterprise persist and in many cases thrive. How has this
been possible?
An intriguing hypothesis is that the very act of bringing together so many workers and ﬁrms can itself
generate these productivity advantages. These so-called agglomeration economies might arise from mecha-
nisms related to sharing, learning, or matching.1 Sharing refers to the production externalities coming from
large indivisible investments that enhance local productivity, in the spirit of Hirschmann’s linkages.2 The
learning hypothesis posits that larger urban areas hold an advantage in either the creation of technology
(Jacobs, 1969) or the formation of human capital (Glaeser and Mar´ e, 2001). The present study, on the other
hand, is concerned with the matching mechanism.
Denser areas also have thicker markets and might therefore beneﬁt from improved search and matching,
as in the seminal “coconut” model of Diamond (1982), which formalized increasing returns to scale in
matching. And search and matching ﬁgure prominently in the market for labor, which is characterized by
heterogeneous workers and jobs. This theory posits that, from the perspective of a worker, ﬁnding a job is
cheaper in a thicker market. Put another way, workers in denser areas would be able to ﬁnd a better job for
the same cost of search.
Market thickness should matter particularly for specialized labor markets.3 Consider a worker who
1This typology is drawn from Duranton and Puga (2004).
2In other words, if a product requires large capital outlays to produce, some markets might be too small to justify such an
investment locally, and therefore ﬁrms in more sparsely populated areas that use the product will have a cost disadvantage.
3The idea of improved search because of thick markets being important for sustaining task-speciﬁc skill is typically attributed
2loses his job in a thinner labor market. He might have to wait an appreciable amount of time before ﬁnding
a position that will take advantage of his skills. But searching and waiting is costly, and it may make more
sense to simply accept a job that is less suited to his skill set. The result would be a loss of human capital.
Moreover, ex ante, such workers have a diminished incentive to accumulate skills that are sector and task
speciﬁc, given that those skills have a more limited expected lifetime. The result is decreased speciﬁc
investment, which augments the original effect of market thinness. This suggests that, by both mechanisms,
we should expect to see less changing of sectors by workers in denser areas. (In Section 3, we review further
the theoretical framework and discuss our empirical speciﬁcation.)
The present study ﬁnds that the rate of occupational and industrial transitions is indeed lower on average
in thicker labor markets. These results are presented in Section 4. We ﬁrst consider data4 from the U.S.
census of 1970, and we show that observationally similar workers are less likely to change occupation and/or
industry in areas with higher population densities. We further demonstrate that this result is not sensitive to
controlling for standard demographic variables, aggregate measures of human capital, and sectoral mix. We
also implement corrections for sorting across areas and for differences in the deﬁnition of area groupings
across regions. These effects are also present in a sample of non-movers and are robust to controlling for
a variety of other area-wide control variables related to income, quality of life, and demographics. As an
additional check, we show that this thick-market effect is present in a sample of displaced workers (in the
1990s) whose job separations were due to plant closings.
On the other hand, cheaper search also implies that workers would want to shop around more for a
good occupational match. By the usual Ben-Porathian logic, they should do this shopping early in their
careers. In accordance with this prediction, we ﬁnd that our result above is weaker for younger workers.
In fact, it is actually reversed: those with less than 10 years of potential experience switch occupations and
industries more in areas that are more densely populated. We see this in Section 5, where we decompose
the estimates by different levels of potential experience in the labor market. This is consistent with the
thick-market model: young workers take advantage of low search costs to search more intensively for the
right occupational match. On the other hand, we argue that this is difﬁcult to rectify with a simple model of
to Alfred Marshall.
4Section 2 and Appendix A describe the data sets employed.
3specialization induced by some non-search reason (e.g., learning spillovers about speciﬁc skills, or greater
returns to specialization because of improved division of labor).
We consider, in Section 6, the implications of our results for the widely documented wage premium
earned by workers in more densely populated areas. Our calculations are based on two factors: (i) our
results imply that speciﬁc skills fall into disuse faster in less dense areas, and (ii) numerous studies have
demonstrated the importance of sector-speciﬁc human capital in worker productivity. The simple combi-
nation of these two facts implies that speciﬁc skills depreciate faster—and wages grow more slowly—in
less dense areas. We compute that this mechanism accounts for around 35% of the faster wage growth in
denser areas. We also consider the ex ante effect: If speciﬁc skills depreciate more slowly in denser areas,
workers will invest more in human capital that is speciﬁc to their chosen industry and/or occupation. To
quantify this effect, we calibrate a simple investment model characterizing the optimal choice of sector- or
activity-speciﬁc skill and ﬁnd that this ex ante investment mechanism could account for a signiﬁcant portion
of the density premium observed in the wage data.
2 Data
This study combines individual and aggregate data. The principal micro-level data set is the 1970 Form 1
Metro sample from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a 1% random sample of the entire
population (Ruggles et al., 2004). We draw aggregate data from a number of sources, including the IPUMS,
the State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (SMADB) (U.S. Census, 1979), and the Historical United States
County (HUSCO) Boundary Files (Earle et al., 1999). More information on these sources is available in the
data appendix.
The key outcome is a change in an individual’s reported occupation or industry. The 1970 IPUMS
reports worker characteristics, including occupation and industry, for two years, 1964 and 1969. We record
changes in these reported codes between years in our binary outcome variable.
We also consider the Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) for the years 1994-2002 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). The DWS is an occasional supplement to the Current Population
Survey, usually conducted in January or February of even-numbered years. The DWS comprises all persons
4displaced from a job within three years of the survey date. To construct the change in outcome, we compare
characteristics of these workers’ pre-displacement job to characteristics of their survey-year job.
Within the DWS, workers may cite reasons for job loss. Possible responses are: (1) their plant or
company may have closed down or moved, (2) there may be insufﬁcient work, (3) their position may have
been abolished, (4) their job may have been seasonal in nature, or (5) their self-operated business failed. We
form a separate “plant closing” sub-sample of the DWS data based on workers who cited reason (1) for their
job loss. For these workers, job separation is arguably exogenous to their unobserved characteristics.
The unit of observation for the aggregate data is the metropolitan area. Geographic location data is sub-
ject to census conﬁdentiality restrictions; therefore, in both samples, we are only able to identify metropoli-
tan areas larger than a certain size. Fortunately, the IPUMS also identiﬁes “county group” of residence for
its entire sample. The county group, a collection of enough contiguous counties to satisfy the census con-
ﬁdentiality requirements, is conceptually comparable to the Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in the
1990 and 2000 census. In 1970, county groups included, for example, county group 1302, consisting only
of New York County (Manhattan), and county group 14002, consisting of 19 counties and an independent
city in southwest Utah and northern Nevada. For the 1970 IPUMS, we assigned county group data to those
individuals outside of one of the identiﬁed metropolitan areas. Individuals within identiﬁed metropolitan ar-
eas kept their afﬁliation with metropolitan-level aggregate data. In this way, we are able to obtain complete
geographic coverage of the country.
The key explanatory variable is local population density. For most individuals in our samples, this is the
population density of their metropolitan area of residence. For the balance of the 1970 IPUMS, this is the
population density of their county group of residence. Figure 1 presents a map of the 1970 county groups
and metro areas with population density indicated via shading. These data come from the SMADB and the
HUSCO. For the 1994-2002 DWS, we assign population density based on data from the 2000 census (U.S.
Census, 2000).
Weobtainmostmetropolitan-levelvariables(outsideofpopulationandarea)byaggregatingtheindividual-
level data from the IPUMS and the DWS. Other individual-level controls also come from these microdata.
Further details on data and methodology are in the data appendix. Table 1 (Continued) provides sum-
mary statistics for the census and DWS samples.
53 Framework
3.1 Background and Related Literature
Labor-market density might have a simple, mechanical effect on occupational switching. This can be seen
by considering occupational choice following the (exogenous) separation of a worker from his job at a
particular ﬁrm. By revealed preference, we know that this worker had some skills, either by endowment or
investment, that were speciﬁc to the activity and/or sector of the previous job. If the separation from the ﬁrm
were permanent, the worker now faces a choice: seek employment doing the same tasks but in a different
ﬁrm, or eschew his sector-speciﬁc skills while taking a job elsewhere in the economy.
A worker in a less dense labor market faces a “small numbers” problem. He happens to be without a
job, but does there happen to be another ﬁrm that needs a worker with his skill set? A multinomial model
serves as a mechanistic approximation to this process. As the market grows larger, the number of excess
workers (or ﬁrms) shrinks in expectation like the square root of the market size.5 The workers in denser
markets beneﬁt from the law of large numbers, leaving them less likely to be in a narrow labor market at
a moment in which their skills are in excess supply. This ex post mechanism generates a lower probability
that a worker would choose to leave his sector in denser markets, all else ﬁxed, and therefore, in effect, his
sector-speciﬁc skill depreciates at a lower rate.
This mechanism should also affect the skill-accumulation decision em ex ante as well. Murphy (1986)
and Kim (1989) propose how density might change the market for sector-speciﬁc skill. In Kim’s model,
ﬁxed costs are important in production, and consequently sparsely populated areas have fewer ﬁrms in each
sector, and workers choose to invest less in narrow skills because there are fewer potential employers in
the event of a separation. A result of this effect is that workers will choose to specialize more. Existing
empirical work supports this contention for physicians (Baumgardner, 1988) and for lawyers (Garicano and
Hubbard, 2007), as well as for a general index of specialization (Ades and Glaeser, 1999).
Thicker labor markets might also increase sector/activity turnover, since search is cheaper. But it might
reduce it insofar as workers have already found good matches with their occupation and/or industry. Which
5See Shimer (2007), e.g., for a formal model of this process applied to the question of unemployment.
6effect dominates is unclear a priori.6 Having acknowledged this ambiguity, we note that search for a good
occupational match is an investment. Therefore, like other human-capital investments, it should be done
earlier rather than later in life. This implies that this positive effect of thick markets on activity switching
should be strongest early in one’s career.
3.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The present study considers the effect of labor-market density on the probability that a worker changes
activity and/or sector. The basic regression speciﬁcation is as follows:
D
ijk =  densityj + k + Xi  + YjW + ijk (1)
for person i in area j who worked in occupation/industry cell k in the base period. The dependent variable,
D
ijk, is an indicator for whether that individual has changed activity and/or sector since the base period.
The central explanatory variable is the density of the area, which we deﬁne in the main speciﬁcations as the
logarithm of population per square mile. Because this variable is deﬁned over j, we cluster the standard
errors at the area level. To adjust for differences in the granularity of occupational and industrial coding,
we include ﬁxed effects for each activity/sector cell (k). The speciﬁcation also includes individual-level
demographic controls (the Xi) and allows for area-level controls as well (Yj).
We entertain a number of alternative speciﬁcations below. Our baseline is estimating equation (1) with
ordinary least squares (OLS). We also address possible identiﬁcation problems, including omitted regional
characteristics and measurement error in local labor market density. In addition, workers with a propensity
to acquire specialized skills may sort into dense cities. We implement an instrumental variables strategy that
relies on the costs of moving from one region to another. And because workers may have other unobserved
traits that lead to job separation, we analyze data on workers whose separations are plausibly exogenous to
any of these characteristics (the displaced-worker sample from the CPS).
6A similar set of issues exists for employer/job switching. In keeping with this, evidence on the sign of the turnover effect
of density has been mixed in recent work by Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006), Groen (2006), de Blasio and Di Addario
(2005), Fox (2002), and the present study. Indeed, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005) estimate a structural model using data on
job searchers in the United Kingdom and ﬁnd that reservation wages adjust just enough to leave search behavior unaffected by
labor-market density. We return to the job-turnover question in Section 4.4. (Also see Coles and Smith (1996) and Shimer (2001)
for evidence on increasing returns to scale in labor-market matching.)
74 Empirical Results
4.1 Main Results: Churning and Density
Using a sample of individuals from the 1970 census, we ﬁnd that workers in areas with higher population
density were less likely to have changed occupation or industry. We argue that the evidence presented in this
section weighs in favor of a substantial decrease in sectoral churning as a result of being in a thicker labor
market. The main result is seen in column 1 of Table 2, which contains estimates of equation 1. A change
of one in log density affects this probability by 0.6%.
The magnitude of the thick-market effect is large enough to be relevant in understanding cross-area
differences. In our sample, the distribution in log density across areas has a standard deviation of approx-
imately 1.4. On the other hand, the standard deviation of average churning across regions is 0.029. Using
the coefﬁcients from Table 2, we compute that a one-standard-deviation change in density results in a de-
crease of one-third of a standard deviation in sectoral switching. (One standard deviation in density is the
difference between Knoxville, Tennessee, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for example.7)
These results are not sensitive to the inclusion of a variety of individual- and aggregate-level controls.
As seen in columns 2 and 3, this estimated effect of density is not affected substantially by the inclusion of
demographic controls, such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, and education. The relationship between density
and sectoral churning is shown in greater detail in Figure 2. In the ﬁgure, the churning measure on the
vertical axis is an average residual from a regression of a dummy for occupation/industry switching on the
controls in column 3. The relationship is similar using any of the sets of controls from Table 2. In columns 4
and 5, we also include several aggregate-level controls. In spite of the marked regional differences in density
seen in Figure 1, including regional dummies changes the point estimate by less than a standard error.
We also include area-level information on educational attainment and ﬁnd that having a more educated
workforce in the area is associated with increased sectoral churning. An important alternative hypothesis
is that cities also have more educated workforces, and learning spillovers provide workers with stronger
incentives to accumulate human capital (in particular, to specialize their human capital). Glaeser and Mar´ e
7One standard deviation is also the approximate difference in population density between San Diego, California, and San
Francisco, California, or between Greenville, South Carolina, and Louisville, Kentucky. Note that these are 1970 numbers.
8(2001) and Peri (2002) provide a treatment of these learning spillovers. Lin (2007) shows further that
human capital contributes to occupational dynamism at both the micro and aggregate levels. Nonetheless,
the resulting estimates of the effect of density are similar to those without aggregate controls.
The effect of labor-market thickness on sectoral switching is evident at various levels of occupational
and industrial classiﬁcation.8 Above, we measure churning as a change in either the detailed occupation or
the detailed industry. In Table 3, we report the estimated effect of population density on sectoral switching,
but in each cell we use different levels of aggregation for occupation and industry. The bottom right cell in
the table replicates the result from column 5 of Table 2, and this set of controls is used throughout Table 3.
Coefﬁcients are larger and generally more precisely determined for more aggregated measures of occupation
and industry switching. Skills are presumably less transferable across aggregated sectors, and thick markets
matter more for these transitions.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The effect of labor-market density on sectoral churning that we observe is robust to a number of different
alternative explanations.
4.2.1 Correction for Sorting
We ﬁrst argue that these results do not arise from the endogenous sorting of individuals across areas. A
plausible alternative hypothesis is that people whose comparative advantage involves greater specialization
migrate to larger cities, where industries might be more at the “cutting edge.” If so, we would expect
less sectoral switching in thicker labor markets, but the effect is due to sorting, not search. To assess this
alternative, we use a simple correction for sorting described below.
The methodology we employ is based on that of Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992), who point out
that regressing individual outcomes on local-area data is problematic in that individuals choose where to
live. In their application, they consider the effect of neighborhood poverty on teen dropout decisions.
Neighborhood-level variables are found to be statistically signiﬁcant determinants of dropout. However,
8We repeat this exercise using a probit estimator and report the estimates in Appendix B. Results are similar to those presented
here.
9when metro-area poverty is used as an instrument for the neighborhood rate, the estimates of poverty are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. They argue that the latter estimate is much less contaminated by sorting,
and therefore the neighborhood-level result was due to endogeneity bias rather than a causal effect.
We implement this speciﬁcation check by using the density of the individual’s state of birth as an instru-
ment for density of the current residence. The logic of doing so is similar to that just stated. The degree of
bias induced by geographic sorting should be less for state of residence than for city of residence. Carrying
the logic one step further, there should be even less sorting by state of birth. (It bears noting that this exercise
is a correction for sorting, not a control for every conceivable channel through which density might affect
sectoral switching. In addition, the Evans-Oates-Schwab method cannot correct for more complex error
structures; see Bayer and Ross (2006).)
The estimates using this methodology suggest that our results are not driven by endogenous sorting. Ta-
ble 4 displays the instrumental-variables (IV) estimates, along with results from the ﬁrst stage. (Regressions
reported in odd- and even-numbered columns contain the same controls as those in Table 2, columns 3 and 5,
respectively.) We consider three higher aggregations of density, all at the state level: contemporaneous den-
sity in the state of residence or state of birth, and 1880 density in the state of birth.9 For each variable, there
is strong ﬁrst-stage relationship between state density and density in the current area of residence. Density
from the state of residence shows the highest elasticity in predicting local-area density. More to the point,
the IV estimates of local density tend to be larger than the OLS estimates presented above. (Regressions
using state-of-birth density as the IV and the additional metro-area characteristics are no longer signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, but neither can they reject that they are equal to the comparable OLS estimates.)
This suggests that sorting, at least within states, is not driving our estimates. (The large IV estimates also
suggest that the main results may be contaminated by measurement error, particularly in measuring local
9Our use of the historical measure of density follows the work of Ciccone and Hall (1996), who instrument current density
with several variables from the 1800s (1880 population density, distance to the Atlantic coast, 1850 population, and the presence
of railroads in 1860). In preliminary work, we also included these other three variables in the analysis but obtained insigniﬁcant
results and/or inappropriate signs for those other variables in the ﬁrst stage. To avoid possible biases, including the well-known
small-sample bias of 2SLS when the system is overidentiﬁed, we use only the 1880 density variable as an historical IV. We also
note that Rosenthal and Strange (2005) have more recently introduced into the literature a geological instrument, which is based
on the appropriateness of the local geological formations (bedrock, e.g.) for supporting skyscrapers. That study focuses on areas
(PUMAs) within cities, and the instrument seems to have some power in explaining the highly concentrated business districts within
metro areas. However, these effects play out over much smaller areas relative to the comparatively low spatial frequency of the
present study. We therefore do not consider the Rosenthal-Strange instrument here because it does not address the relevant problem
of this subsection: sorting of workers across metro areas and county groups.
10labor-market density. This possibility is explored below.)
4.2.2 Measurement Error
Because the atomistic unit in forming metropolitan areas and county groups is counties, very large counties,
or the uneven distribution of population within large counties, may affect our estimates. For example, in our
1970 data, the Los Angeles metropolitan area includes the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and
Ventura. The densities of northern Ventura county or eastern Riverside county (bordering Arizona) are very
low relative to the balance of the metropolitan area.
Other measures of density yield estimates that are similar to the main results but reﬂect the larger mag-
nitudes of the IV results. In Table 5, Panel A, each row contains estimated coefﬁcients on log density for a
different density concept. Each cell is a separate regression, either on the entire sample or one of four cen-
sus regions. The ﬁrst row uses our original density measure, calculated for consolidated metropolitan areas
and county groups. Log density predicts reduced switching between sectors in the full sample and across
regions. However, in the South and West, this estimate is less precise and not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. These regions, especially with the West’s large counties, may be especially sensitive to the uneven
distribution of population within metropolitan areas and county groups.
The second row contains estimates using an adjusted measure of density. Here, county group densi-
ties remain the same as the original measure. However, within metropolitan areas, density is calculated
as a weighted average of component county group densities. For example, density for the Los Angeles
metropolitan area is determined by a weighted average of the densities of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside,
and Ventura counties—each of which constitutes a separate county group. The weights are determined by
county population; in effect, we are calculating the “average” county-group density experienced by a worker
in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Estimates using this measure are similar to the main results. In the
West, the effect of density on switching is now signiﬁcant.
We calculate the third and fourth density concepts based on workers’ county group of residence. The
former is a weighted average of component county densities, using data from the 1972 City and County
Data Book (ICPSR, 1984). The latter is a weighted average of component census tract data, using data from
the CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database, a commercial product containing U.S. census tract data for
111970 (GeoLytics, 2001). Results using these measures echo earlier ones. In sum, we conclude that errors in
density measurement do not drive our results.
Alternatively, we use these adjusted density measures as instruments for log density. The baseline
density measure may under-report actual local labor-market density for metropolitan areas or county groups
where population centers are small relative to the size of the county or county group (bias toward zero). The
IV procedure should correct for this sort of bias.
In Table 5, Panel B, each column contains separate regression estimates using alternative density mea-
sures as instruments. Measures are weighted averages of component densities (tracts, counties, or county
group) of workers’ county group of residence. Column 4 uses all three alternative measures as instruments.
We ﬁnd strong effects of log density on sectoral switching using the adjusted density measures as instru-
ments. The IV estimates here are also similar to the estimates that use the Evans-Oates-Schwab sorting
correction. In sum, corrections for measurement error suggest that the OLS results understate the effect of
local density on sectoral switching.
Finally, we ﬁnd further support for negative thick-market effects on switching when adding sectoral and
occupation employment shares to the model, as seen in Table 5, Panel C. According to our logic above,
activities with higher employment shares are in effect thicker labor markets. To test this importance of this
dimension of thickness, in columns 2–4 of Panel C, we add the log employment shares for three-digit occu-
pation and industry. (Recall that these regressions already contain dummies for lagged occupationindustry
at the three-digit level, so estimates are being made within sectors and activities.) Consistent with the results
above for metro-area density, we estimate negative coefﬁcients on employment shares.10
4.2.3 Additional Speciﬁcation Checks
The results above are not sensitive to controlling for a variety of alternative aggregate-level variables. These
results are seen in Panel A of Table 6. For reference, the ﬁrst row repeats the density estimates from above.
Subsequent rows also include estimates of the density effect after including in the regression the speciﬁed
10We do not base the main analysis of the paper on employment share because this measure strikes us as more prone to en-
dogeneity problems: sorting can occur both across areas and within areas among sectors and activities. Also, while we present
several plausible corrections for area-wide density in Table 4 above, it is harder to imagine implementing comparable strategies for
areaindustry/occupation density.
12control variables. (The sources for these additional controls are described in Appendix A.2.) The next row
displays results after controlling for a set of demographic variables: race and age composition and decennial
population change. The third row of Panel A controls for a set of employment and income variables: the
local unemployment and poverty rates, and median income and rent levels.11 For the fourth row, we include
controls for amenities such as average January and July temperatures, July humidity, and the local receipt-
share of recreation-related industries. The ﬁnal row contains estimates of density controlling for all of these
additional variables. The estimates with additional controls are within approximately one standard error of
the baseline results, sometimes higher and sometimes lower. Nevertheless, the speciﬁcation with the most
thorough set of controls yields estimates that are uniformly lower than the baseline results.
Given the concerns about the mismeasurement of density expressed above, we repeat this exercise, but
use the alternative measures of density as instruments to correct for measurement. The 2SLS results are
seen in Panel B of Table 6. The estimates are indeed higher than comparable OLS results, as expected if
the measurement error were classical. However, the magnitudes of the density effect, when both controlling
for the additional variables and using instruments for measurement error, are quite similar to the baseline
results.
In Panel C of Table 6, we address several other speciﬁcation issues related to selection. Information
from the census on migration provides a check for problems of spatial sorting. By observing metropolitan
area/county group of residence ﬁve years ago (in 1965), we separate the 1970 census sample into non-
movers and movers. Movers may be those with a comparative advantage in specializing who self-select
into thicker labor markets, as discussed earlier. Results in the ﬁrst row of Panel C using only non-movers
conﬁrm the main result. In the second row of that panel, we present results from a subsample that excludes
observations that have been edited or allocated by the census. These estimates are essentially the same as
those found above. As an additional speciﬁcation check, we also consider the role played by censoring of
the sectoral data. The basic sample used above contains individuals whose occupation and industry data are
non-missing for both the census year and ﬁve years prior. This sample used in the third row of Panel C is
of all individuals for whom we observe prior occupation and industry. Density does not predict censoring at
11Unionization is a plausible determinant of occupational and industry switching, but data by county were not readily available
for 1970. However, we can construct such measures using the displaced-workers sample and implement the speciﬁcation check
with those data. These results are shown in Appendix C.
13conventional levels of statistical conﬁdence. (Student’s t statistics are all less than one in absolute value.) In
any case, the magnitude of the estimate is much smaller than the effect of density on sectoral switching.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the negative effects of density on churning are present across the gamut of one-
digit sectors and activities. These results are shown in Appendices D and E for occupations and industries,
respectively. Apart from farming/farmers, the coefﬁcients on density are uniformly negative and, in almost
all cases, statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that this switching effect of density is at play for various
activities.
4.3 Displacement
We ﬁnd a similar effect of density on sectoral switching using samples from the Current Population Survey’s
Displaced Worker Supplement between 1994 and 2002. For example, column 3, row 3 of Table 7 shows
that a change of one in log density decreases the probability of changing detailed occupation or detailed
industry by 1.6%. The magnitude of this estimate is comparable to that of the 1970 result. Again, a one-
standard-deviation increase in density results in a decrease of one-third of a standard deviation in sectoral
switching.
However, this estimate is imprecise. Standard errors reported for changes in detailed occupation and
detailed industry group in Table 7 are large, relative to the magnitude of the coefﬁcient estimate. In contrast,
estimates for the effect of density on the probability of another type of sector change, changing only detailed
occupation, have smaller standard errors. As seen in row 3, the estimated effect of density is of similar
magnitude, but it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level. The Displaced Worker results are
robust to different levels of aggregation for occupation and industry.
The effect of density on sectoral switching is present even when workers leave their jobs involuntarily.
In the Displaced Worker sample, we can identify the reason each worker left his or her previous job. One-
third of workers in the sample lost their jobs because of a plant closure. Importantly, their job separation
can be thought of as exogenous to any unobservable worker skill. (Other reasons for displacement, such as
layoff or seasonal employment, may be related to unobserved skill, which may in turn affect churning.)
Panel B of Table 7 shows estimates using only workers whose plants closed. According to the estimate in
column 1, row 3, a change of one in log density decreases the probability of changing detailed occupation by
143.3%. It is important that our main result is robust to involuntary job separation. An alternative explanation
is that unobserved shocks, correlated with density, also affect the probability of job separation. The plant
closing data show that our results are not driven by such shocks.
The magnitudes of the estimates using workers displaced by plant closings seem larger than those ob-
tained using other data. A one-standard-deviation change in density results in a decrease of one-half of a
standard deviation change in sectoral switching. It is plausible that thicker markets matter more in the case
of a negative shock to demand for a particular specialized skill. However, the magnitudes of the standard
errors prevent a deﬁnitive conclusion.
4.4 Relation to Job Changing
The Displaced Worker Supplement is also paired with the Job Tenure Supplement, which records additional
information on workers’ job histories. For example, we can use the Tenure Supplement to examine the
relationship between job changing (i.e., changing employers) and sector switching (changing from one
industry-occupation to another). Using the Tenure Supplement, we record a dummy variable indicating
whether a worker has changed employers in the previous three years.
An alternative explanation for our results is that workers in thicker markets change employers less, lead-
ing to reduced sector switching. This implies a somewhat different mechanism than skill matching in thicker
labor markets. We ﬁnd that workers in dense regions are indeed less likely to change employers. The re-
gressions presented in Table 8, Panel A use employer change as the dependent variable, with log density and
other controls as explanatory variables. The coefﬁcient on log density is negative and precisely estimated.
One interpretation of this result is that workers in thicker markets, by some agglomeration mechanism, face
a lower risk of being separated from their employers.12 A speciﬁcally thick-market interpretation is that
workers easily ﬁnd good employer matches the ﬁrst time around and therefore have less need to re-match
down the road.
Importantly, however, the addition of this variable leaves the estimated effect of log density on sector
switching unchanged. This employer change variable is included separately from log density in the sector
12This density effect on employer transitions is similarly negative across potential experience categories, as seen in Appendix G.
This suggests an area-wide job-changing effect that is also distinct from the sector-switching effects in Figure 3 (discussed below).
15switching regressions presented in Table 8, Panel B. As expected, workers that change employers also
tend to switch sectors. The coefﬁcient on the employer-change variable is positive and estimated precisely.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of density effect on sectoral/activity switching is comparable to those presented
in Table 2. This suggests that even when controlling for the lower rate of employer transitions in dense cities,
we still observe that workers are less likely to abandon their sector or activity in thicker labor markets. We
conclude that skill matching is still an important mechanism operating in thicker labor markets and that it is
distinct from speciﬁc employer-employee matching.
5 Decompositions by Potential Experience
We ﬁnd heterogeneity in the effect of density on occupational/industrial switching across different levels
of potential experience in the labor market. These results are found in Figure 3, which presents the density
coefﬁcient from switching regressions that are estimated for each level of potential experience.13 In Panel A,
each point displays the results from a separate regression whose dependent variable is an indicator variable
for a change in detailed occupation or industry group (the most disaggregate classiﬁcation). The solid line
is a smoothed version of the estimated coefﬁcients. Panel B reports similar, smoothed estimates for the full
set of aggregations of industry and occupation codings (as in Table 3). The density coefﬁcients tend to be
negative after around 10 years of potential experience. On the other hand, the effect of density tends to be
positive before reaching 10 years in the labor market for all measures of switching but one (the exception
being one of the most aggregated measures).
The positive effect of density on switching early in one’s career is perfectly consistent with a model of
thick-market effects in job search, but difﬁcult to rectify with a simple model of induced specialization from
theproductionside(vialabordemand). Amodelwithincreasingreturnstolabor-marketsearchcouldpredict
that workers take advantage of low search costs to search more intensively for the right occupational match.
Depending on the parameters of the model, this effect could dominate the negative, mechanistic effect
13The speciﬁcation parallels equation 1 above. All regressions include dummies for gender, race, marital status, citizenship, and
years of education. Because of the limited sample size when partitioning by potential experience, the average effects of the lagged
detailed industry and occupation dummies were removed in a ﬁrst-step regression using the whole sample. Note, however, that the
sample differs from that of the main analysis in that observations are included from the full census based on potential experience
rather than age.
16discussed above. Moreover, because search intensity is an investment whose gains are realized throughout
the working lifetime, this new, positive effect would be strongest at younger ages. Contrast this with a
simple model in which urban workers are more specialized for some non-search reason (e.g., faster learning
about speciﬁc skills, or greater returns to specialization because of improved division of labor). This might
generate a zero effect in the early years (before workers have gotten locked in by their specialized capital).
However, this would not generate a positive effect at low levels of labor-market experience.14
6 Implications for Wages
We discuss several channels through which the results above could also have implications for wage differ-
ences across areas with differing labor-market densities. We consider mechanisms that are either em ex post
or ex ante relative to the potential occupation/industry change. For comparison purposes, we present two
facts about the effect of labor-market density on wages: (i) at low levels of experience, wages are around
7% higher per a one-logarithm increase in density; (ii) over the working lifetime, workers in denser areas
see higher returns to experience, and this wage gap grows to 9%. (See Appendix F for these results.)
6.1 Ex post Mechanism
The main results of the present study imply lower growth rates for wages in less dense areas, through
a simple, ex post mechanism: speciﬁc skills fall into disuse faster. We show above that occupation and
industry switching is lower in areas with higher population density. In more sparsely populated areas, this
mechanism increases the depreciation rate of skills that are speciﬁc to a worker’s starting sector and/or
14More complicated models of specialization could be generated that produce the positive effect of density on switching in the
early career. A sensible point of departure would be from the model of Neal (1999), who argues that occupations are in effect
“experience goods”: Workers need to spend time in a particular occupation to learn about their idiosyncratic match quality. If
some agglomeration economy on the production side increases the variance on the unobserved component of the idiosyncratic
worker/activity match, this would raise the beneﬁt of further searching for the right occupation/industry. While this contrasts with
the increasing-returns-to-scale model of search and matching, which reduces the cost of search, the reduced-form effect would be
the same: more switching earlier in one’s career. Note, however, that density-related increases in the predictable component of that
worker’s potential gains from specialization would not generate this positive effect on switching, because the worker would have
gone to the highest-value job in the ﬁrst place.
17activity. Consider the law of motion for sector-speciﬁc skill, Hs:
_ Hs = Is   Hs (2)
where Is is skill investment and  is the skill depreciation rate. From this equation, we see that an increase
in the depreciation rate reduces the growth rate of skills, absent any change in investment behavior. (Below
we show that faster depreciation reduces investment.)
To understand the ﬁrst-order impact of this mechanism on the wage, we need to know what fraction of
skill is industry/occupation speciﬁc.15 Using the Displaced Worker Surveys, Neal (1995, p. 665) estimates
that 10% of their income was derived from industry-speciﬁc skill for men with 10 years of post-displacement
experience. On the other hand, Parent (2000, p. 317) uses detailed work-history data to estimate simultane-
ously returns to both industry and total labor-market experience. For workers with 10 years of continuous
industry experience, 10 to 20% of their income was derived from industry-speciﬁc skill.16 We consider
fractions between 5 and 25% in the analysis below.
We can account for 10 to 60% of the higher return to experience in denser areas with this ex post mech-
anism. We start with the typical estimate of the effect of log density on three-digit industry/occupation
switching: approximately 0.6%, measured over a ﬁve-year horizon, or about 4.8% over a 40-year career.
We take this latter number and multiply it by the various estimates for the baseline fraction of sector-speciﬁc
skills. The calculations indicate that, over a 40-year career, a reduction of one logarithm of labor-market
density implies somewhere between 0.2% and 1.2% lower wage growth through this mechanism of ac-
celerated skill depreciation. (Note that this is purely a mechanical effect that comes from the differential
depreciation of speciﬁc skills. No behavior has been assumed to change, yet.) In comparison, the extra
growth in dense-area wages, in the same units, amounts to around 2% over 40 years.
15There is most likely more than one number characterizing this fraction. First, the speciﬁc/general dichotomy is perhaps too
stark. Some skills might transfer to a limited number of other occupations or industries, but not beyond that. (See Gathmann and
Sch¨ onberg, 2006.) Second, this fraction certainly must vary across workers. More experienced workers will probably have a higher
fraction of speciﬁc skill than newly minted graduates, for example. And of course this fraction will eventually be higher for workers
in dense areas, for precisely the mechanism discussed here. We present this static framework in the hope that, for what it lacks in
realism, it makes up for in transparency.
16Shaw (1984, 1987) also discusses the importance of occupational skills, but we did not see a clear way to translate her estimates
into the desired number.
186.2 Ex ante Mechanisms
The results above could also raise labor productivity in more densely populated areas through several ex ante
mechanisms. The differential effects on switching by experience (seen in Section 5) suggest that thicker
markets allow for better occupational matching early in one’s career, although it is not clear whether the
associated gains would take the form of higher productivity or just more satisﬁed workers. On the other
hand, better preservation of speciﬁc skill in denser areas affects comparative advantage across space. Be-
cause cities are like the small open economies of the textbook trade models, we expect that high-speciﬁc-
investment occupations would concentrate in denser areas. Indeed, we do ﬁnd that occupations with higher
returns to experience are more likely to be found in more densely populated areas.17
An additional ex ante effect of reduced depreciation of speciﬁc skills is that workers will choose to
invest more in human capital that is speciﬁc to their industry and/or occupation. We calibrate a simple
investment model characterizing the optimal choice of sector/activity-speciﬁc skill, Hs. If we think of this
skill as an asset with a time-invariant return, as in Ben-Porath (1967, 1970), it has a present value that will
be proportional to 
Hs=(r + ), for an interest rate of r, a skill-depreciation of rate , and a return to skill
of 
. Again following Ben-Porath,18 we deﬁne the cost of skill-acquisition to be c
 
Hs +  H
, where  H is
a given quantity of general skill.19 We impose the usual convexity assumption:  > 1. These two terms
17Speciﬁcally, we use the 1970 census data to estimate the following wage equation:
lnwik = 






for individual i and occupation k. The left-hand side, lnw, is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage, “potexp” is potential
experience, and the 
k and k are occupation-speciﬁc slope and level effects, respectively. Note that a ﬁfth-order polynomial in
potential experience is among the controls, as is the linear interaction of potential experience with local-area density (as deﬁned
for the main results of the paper). This means that 
k measures the returns to experience in that occupation, relative to other
occupations, and over and above any direct effect of labor-market density on wage growth. (Results are similar if we control for
selection via either a Heckman two-step procedure or by including the fraction of that occupation’s employment represented at
worker i’s level of potential experience. For computational reasons, we run one regression for each occupation k using the full
sample, rather than a single regression with the full set of dummies and interactions.) The resulting estimates of 
k are compared
with the average labor-market density by occupation and found to be correlated positively and signiﬁcantly at conventional levels
of statistical conﬁdence.
18This is a modest departure from his model in that we treat Hs as the result of a one-shot, early-career investment, while Ben-
Porath models the life-cycle timing of such investments. The form of the cost function is nevertheless similar because Ben-Porath
imposes curvature based on the current stock of skill rather than on the period-speciﬁc investment ﬂow. Also, one of the central
results of Ben-Porath’s model is that training investments are concentrated early in life. We have experimented with speciﬁcations
that allow for a dynamic element in the skill investment decision and obtain results similar to those below.
19To keep units consistent, we treat Hs in years-of-schooling equivalents. Therefore, again by Ben-Porathian reasoning, we take
the return to skill to be proxied by the return to schooling.
19are both denominated in units of wages, consistent with the return to and opportunity cost of human capital
being related to the wage.

























   H: (4)
The elasticity of H









(   1)(r + )
< 0; (5)
This last equation20 gives us the response of speciﬁc skill in terms of the skill depreciation rate, the curvature
of the skill production function, the fraction of skills that are sector-speciﬁc ( = Hs=(Hs +  H)), and the
interest rate. The interest rate is a commonly observed parameter, but the other three are not so ubiquitous.
The literature discussed above suggests that  is between 10 and 20%. We now review the literature on the
other two parameters:
1. What is the depreciation rate () for skill? Using U.S. data, Heckman (1976) presents an estimate of
3.7% (on a yearly basis) for the skill depreciation rate. Arrazola and de Hevia (2004) estimate  to be
around 1.4% per annum in Spanish data. Groot (1998) estimates numbers that are considerably larger
20Note that this calculation was based on an inﬁnite-horizon approximation to the present value of H
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s. Solving the model with
a ﬁnite-career assumption makes a neglible difference. Deﬁning ~ H

s to be the optimal choice of sector-speciﬁc human capital with































s is characterized in equation 5. In words, this ﬁnite-horizon elasticity can be
decomposed into two terms: the inﬁnite-horizon elasticity plus a second, horizon-adjustment term. When we calibrate this equation
using the parameters below and a horizon of 40 years, the ﬁrst term is of order 10 while the second term is around 0.003. Because
the ﬁnite-horizon adjustment is three to four orders of magnitude smaller than the main effect, we opt for simplicity and present the
inﬁnite-horizon approximation.
20in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (around 10%–15%), but that study does not account for
the tendency for skills investment to decline later in one’s career (as observed by Ben-Porath (1970),
for example). Mincer and Ofek (1982) estimate depreciation rates between 3%–7% per year, but they
measure this effect for workers who have just completed a non-employment spell. For this reason,
their estimates are presumably an upper bound on the estimate of  for workers that are more-or-less
continuously employed. Below, we consider estimates of  between zero and four.
2. What is the degree of curvature () of the skill cost function? Ben-Porath (1970) uses data on training
over the life-cycle to estimate 1= around 0.93 (i.e., close to linear). Heckman (1976) ﬁts Ben-
Porath’s model using the age-earnings proﬁle and estimates 1= to be 0.812. Furthermore, when
Heckman augments the model to allow for reduced-form time variation in the value of leisure, he
ﬁnds 1= to be 0.52, although this parameter is less precisely estimated than in the previous case.
The model also places restrictions on the choice of parameters. In particular, given a skill-depreciation
rate () and a sector-speciﬁc-skill share (), the model implies a particular curvature for the skill cost func-
tion (). For example, if  is large in the presence of a high , it must be the case that it is easy to scale up
one’s human capital investment (i.e.,  closer to one). This relationship can be seen in Panel A of Figure 4.
We consider two cases: an upper bound on the fraction of sector-speciﬁc skill ( = :25) and a lower bound
( = :05).21 Both lines are downward sloping, as expected from the logic above. Because we wish to avoid
nonsensical combinations of parameters, we calibrate the model with various plausible choices of  and ,
and use these model-implied restrictions on  in the process.
Wenowhaveenoughingredientsforapproximatingtheeffectofdensityonexanteinvestmentsinsector-
speciﬁc skill. The empirical results in Section 4 provide estimates of @
@ lnD, where D is labor-market density.
The maximization problem above itself deﬁnes
@ lnH
s
@ , and the parameter selection was just discussed. The
product of these two numbers yields
@ lnH
s
@ lnD , the effect of density on speciﬁc skill (and, via returns to skill,
the wage).
The calibrated model implies economically important effects of density on investment in sector-speciﬁc
21We consider  on the range of estimates identiﬁed above. The other parameters are set as follows. We choose an interest rate
of r = :02, the returns to skill of 
 = :1, average schooling of  H = 11:38. We use c  1, for which the range of implied  match
the estimates above.
21skill, although the uncertainty associated with these parameters leaves a somewhat wide range of possible
values for this computation. These results can be seen in Panel B of Figure 4, where we measure the effect
of density-induced skill investment on the wage. As above, we consider ranges of sectoral-skill fractions
() and baseline skill-depreciation rates () consistent with the available empirical work. Across this set
of possible parameter values, the implied elasticity from density to the wage varies from between 0.14 and
0.22. In words, we expect an increase in labor-market density of one natural logarithm to cause additional
sectoral-skill investments that would raise the worker’s productivity by around 14 to 22%. This compares
with an estimated 7–10% density premium for wages and suggests that this ex ante investment mechanism
can account for perhaps all of the dense-area wage premium.
Afewcaveatlectorsareinorder. First, tocalibratethemodel, weusedtheOLSestimatesfromSection4,
but these were contaminated by sorting and measurement-error biases. As seen above, these biases seem
to offset each other, leaving an IV estimate of  that was somewhat higher than the OLS number. This
suggests that the wage effects might be higher than those calibrated here. Second, we model the agent above
as maximizing expected value, but idiosyncratic wage uncertainty is a textbook example of non-diversiﬁable
risk. If workers are risk averse, market thinness will presumably depress sector-speciﬁc investment even
further. Finally, the estimates of differential depreciation by density () build in both the direct effect of
thick markets on switching (i.e., easier matching to a new job in the same sector/activity) and indirect
effects (e.g., that speciﬁc investments make it less likely that a worker will choose to switch activities).
Ideally we would calibrate this model with only the direct component, but it is unobserved. Because the
direct and indirect components are of the same sign, our calibration above produces an over-estimate of the
impact on wages. It is worth noting, however, that the calibrated wage effect via ex ante investment scales
down proportionately with the estimate of @
@ lnD. So, if the direct impact of density on the depreciation of
sector-speciﬁc skill were one-tenth of the parameter we estimate in Section 4, the effect of density on skill
investment would nevertheless account for about a quarter of the observed density effect on wages.
227 Conclusion
Observationally similar workers change occupation and industry less in more densely populated areas. This
result is not sensitive to controlling for standard demographic variables, aggregate measures of human cap-
ital, and sectoral mix. We also implement corrections for sorting across areas and for differences in the
construction of census areas across regions. Furthermore, we show that this thick-market effect is present in
a sample of displaced workers whose job separations were involuntary.
We interpret these results as evidence of increasing-returns-to-scale matching in local labor markets (in
the sense of Diamond’s (1982) “coconut” model). A worker in a less dense labor market faces a small
numbers problem: is there a similar job available right after he happens tolose his? In contrast, workers in
denser markets beneﬁt from the law of large numbers, leaving them less likely to be in a narrow labor market
at a moment in which their skills are in excess supply. This ex post mechanism generates a lower probability
that a worker would choose to leave his sector in denser markets. Put another way, from the perspective
of a worker, ﬁnding a job is cheaper in a thicker market. This interpretation is further supported by results
decomposed by different levels of potential experience in the labor market. The positive switching/density
result in the very early career is consistent with the thick-market model, but it is difﬁcult to rectify with a
simple model of specialization induced by some non-search reason.
This mechanism has an important role in raising both wages and returns to experience in denser areas.
Workers in more densely populated areas, on average, earn higher wages and experience faster wage growth.
The thick-market model matches these facts qualitatively, and we use a calibrated model to assess its quan-
titative contribution. The faster depreciation of speciﬁc skills estimated above account for around 35% of
the faster wage growth in denser areas. Moreover, facing this diminished rate of speciﬁc skill depreciation,
workers in denser areas will invest more in human capital that is speciﬁc to their chosen industry and/or
occupation. The calibrated model suggests that this ex ante investment mechanism accounts for a signiﬁcant
fraction of the density premium observed in the wage data, although uncertainty about the model parameters
leaves a fairly wide range of possible values for this computation.
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Years of Potential Experience
Panel B: Various Levels of Aggregation, Smoothed
Notes: In Panel A, each point displays the results from a separate regression whose dependent variable is an indicator variable for a change
in detailed occupation or industry group. The y axis measures the density coefﬁcient from these regressions. The x axis is years of potential
experience in the labor market. All regressions include dummies for gender, race, marital status, and citizenship, years of education. Because of
the limited sample size when partitioning by potential experience, the average effects of the lagged detailed industry and occupation dummies were
removed in a ﬁrst-step regression using the whole sample. The solid line is a smoothed version of the estimated coefﬁcients, produced using Stata’s
“lowess” procedure. Panel B reports similar, smoothed estimates for the full set of aggregations of industry and occupation codings (as in Table 3).
Note that the sample differs from that of the main analysis in that observations are included based on potential experience rather than age.
30Figure 4: Approximate Effects on Labor Productivity; Calibrations and Sensitivity Analysis
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Notes: This ﬁgure reports results from the calibrated model of investment in sector-speciﬁc skill from Section 6. Panel A shows the model-implied
relationship between the skill-depreciation rate () and the curvature of the cost function (). Solid line indicates the relationship between  and
 when the fraction of sector-speciﬁc skills is high ( = 0:25). Dotted line represents the case when the fraction of sector-speciﬁc skills is low
( = 0:05). Panel B considers the same cases for  and reports calibrated estimates of the wage/density elasticity, which are constructed from
equation 5 and the model-implied  shown in Panel A. Following the results in Section 4, we assume the effect of log density on sector-speciﬁc
skill depreciation to be 0.6% per ﬁve years, or 0.12% in continuously compounded terms. Calculations also assume a continuous-time, real interest
rate of 2% per year and a return to skill of 10% per year. The sources for the other parameters are detailed in Section 6.
31Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable: 1970 PUMS '94-'-02 DWS
Panel A. Occupation and industry changes
Detailed occupation or industry group  0.414 0.747
Detailed occupation group  0.358 0.607
Minor occupation group  0.241 -
Major occupation group  0.207 0.423
Detailed industry group  0.262 0.617
Minor industry group  0.213 -
Major industry group  0.165 0.407
Panel B. Metropolitan-area controls
Log density 3.761 5.520
(1.358) (0.731)
Average educational attainment, years 11.176 13.375
(0.744) (0.699)
Share of workforce with bachelor's degree 0.124 0.094
(0.038) (0.050)
Share of workforce with some college 0.121 0.477
(0.038) (0.095)
Share of workforce with HS diploma 0.337 0.330
(0.065) (0.094)




Share of workforce in professional occ.
Note: Table continues next page.
32Table 1 (Continued): Summary statistics
Variable: 1970 PUMS '94-'-02 DWS







Age 25-34 0.244 0.337
Age 35-44 0.255 0.328
Age 45-54 0.275 0.240
Age 55-65 0.226 0.094
Less than high school 0.402 0.104
High school diploma 0.327 0.306
Some college 0.134 0.510
Bachelor's degree or greater 0.137 0.080
Age 44.34 40.22
(11.26) (9.87)
Educational attainment, years 11.38 13.36
(3.28) (2.53)
(mean and std. dev.)
Notes: As indicated, entries reﬂect either the mean and standard deviation of the row variable, or the share of population in the row category.
Samples are the 1970 Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), and the Displaced Worker Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey,
1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. PUMS sample includes all workers age 25 to 65; DWS sample includes all workers age 25 to 65 who were displaced
from their jobs within the 3 years of the survey date. Individual-level statistics calculated on population where either occupation or industry, or
both, are identiﬁed in both periods. Metropolitan-level statistics calculated on population in the labor force, age 25 to 65, at the time of the survey.
DWS estimates come from the full CPS sample. PUMS sample sizes: occupation-identiﬁed sample, 516,854; industry-identiﬁed sample, 518,801;
both occupation- and industry-identiﬁed sample, 509,643; number of metropolitan areas and county groups, 328. DWS sample size: main sample,
11,211; number of metropolitan areas, 191.
33Table 2: Occupation and industry switching, 1970 PUMS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log density (/100) -0.637  *** -0.623  *** -0.623  *** -0.542  *** -0.541  ***
(0.160) (0.144) (0.140) (0.103) (0.104)
Male - 0.031  *** 0.029  *** 0.032  *** 0.030  ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Black - -0.009  ** -0.011  *** -0.011  *** -0.012  ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Hispanic - -0.011  *** -0.011  *** -0.012  *** -0.011  ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married - -0.014  *** -0.014  *** -0.014  *** -0.014  ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Citizen - -0.051  *** -0.048  *** -0.048  *** -0.046  ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Educational attainment - 0.006  *** - 0.006  *** -
(0.000) (0.000)
Age group dummies - X - X -
Potential experience terms and - - X - X
 education group dummies 
Region dummies - - - X X
Share of population - - - 0.266  *** 0.268  ***
 with college degree (0.085) (0.086)
Share of population - - - 0.258  *** 0.248  ***
 with some college (0.071) (0.070)
Share of population - - - 0.057  * 0.067  **
 with HS diploma (0.033) (0.033)
Share of population working - - - 0.075  *** 0.075  ***
 in manufacturing industry (0.017) (0.017)
Share of population working  - - - -0.228  ** -0.233  **
 in professional occupational (0.090) (0.091)
Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.194 0.197 0.2 0.197
Notes: Each column displays the results from a separate regression. The dependent variable is an indicator variable if there is a change in detailed
occupation or industry group between 1964 and 1969. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area/county group, are reported in
parentheses. Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a ; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99%
level, a ***. All regressions include a constant and ﬁxed effects for lagged detailed industry  occupation. Number of observations is 509,643.
Number of clusters is 328.
34Table 3: Alternative Aggregations of Occupation and Industry, 1970 PUMS
Industry change
Occupation change No change Major Group Minor Group Detailed Group
 No change -      -0.548  -0.753  -0.826 
-      (0.096) (0.105) (0.106)
Major Group -0.741  -0.740  -0.764  -0.754 
(0.086) (0.102) (0.106) (0.106)
 Minor group -0.820  -0.788  -0.762  -0.694 
(0.092) (0.101) (0.103) (0.105)
Detailed Group -0.656  -0.602  -0.581  -0.542 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104)
Notes: Eachentryrepresentsaseparateregression. Cellscontainestimatesforthecoefﬁcientonlogdensity(/100). Dependentvariableisoccupation
change or industry change between 1964 and 1969, at the aggregation level indicated by row and column headings. Standard errors, adjusted for
clustering on metropolitan area/county group, are reported in parentheses. Number of observations of occupation-changing, 516,854; industry-
changing, 518,801, both occupation- and industry-changing, 509,643. Regressions include covariates as speciﬁed in column (5) of Table 2. All
coefﬁcients in the table are statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence.
Table 4: Occupation and Industry Switching, Correction for Sorting
State of Residence State of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Estimates from Two-Stage Least Squares
Log density (/100) -1.439  *** -0.917  * -1.545  *** -1.226    -1.317  *** 0.337 
(0.183) (0.530) (0.198) (0.894) (0.216) (0.661)
Metropolitan area controls - X - X - X
Panel B. First-Stage Results
Log state density 0.771  *** 0.369  *** 0.566  *** 0.202  ***
(0.140) (0.100) (0.111) (0.041)
Log state density, 1880 0.469  *** 0.214  ***
(0.106) (0.100)
Notes: Each column displays the results from a separate regression. The dependent variable is an indicator variable if there is a change in detailed
occupation or industry group between 1964 and 1969. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on state (of residence or birth, as appropriate), are
reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a ; at the 95% level, a ;
and at the 99% level, a ***. All regressions include lagged detailed industry  occupation dummies. Log density (/100) at the state level is used
as an instrument for density at the metro-area/county-group level. Density for the state of residence is used in columns 1–2, while density from the
state of birth is used in columns 3–6. Population density in 1880 for the state of birth is used as the excluded instrument in columns 5–6, following
Ciccone and Hall (1996). Number of observations is 421,750 for the state-of-residence regressions and 459,411 for the state-of-birth regressions.
The former sample is smaller because state of residence is censored for some due to privacy concerns. State of birth is not observed for non-natives,
hence citizenship status is dropped from those regressions.
35Table 5: Alternative Measures of Density, 1970 PUMS
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Panel A. Using alternative measures of density
Decomposed by region
Northeast Midwest South West
Density measure
1 Log density, metro area -0.782  *** -0.881  *** -1.049  *** -0.125    -0.515   
(0.141) (0.202) (0.283) (0.167) (0.369)
2 Log density, county group -0.707  *** -0.697  *** -1.136  *** -0.085    -0.711  ***
(0.081) (0.131) (0.167) (0.180) (0.239)
3 Log density, county -0.758  *** -0.707  *** -1.234  *** -0.181    -0.874  ***
(0.086) (0.137) (0.189) (0.187) (0.231)
4 Log density, tract -0.637  *** -0.571  *** -0.801  *** -0.409  *** -0.267   
(0.116) (0.129) (0.202) (0.151) (0.266)
Panel B. Alternative measures of density as IV
Alternative density measure used as instrument
Baseline Tract County All
B.1. Estimates from Two-Stage Least Squares
Log density (/100) -0.541  *** -1.577  *** -1.307  *** -1.531  *** -1.210  ***
(0.104) (0.121) (0.088) (0.104) (0.086)
 B.2. First-Stage Results 
Alternative density measure 0.485  *** 0.563  *** 0.514  *** -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel C. Include employment share of worker's industry/occupation
Log density (/100) -0.541  *** -0.650  *** -0.744  *** -0.810  ***
(0.104) (0.107) (0.116) (0.001)
Log employment share, -2.743  *** -2.017  ***
  3-digit occupation (0.297) (0.257)
Log employment share, -3.998  *** -3.599  ***




Notes: Each cell displays the results from a separate regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density (/100). The dependent
variable is the change in detailed occupation or industry group between 1964 and 1969. All regressions contain log density, individual, and aggregate
controls, as in column 5 of table 2. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area/county group, are reported below in parentheses.
Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a ; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99% level,
a ***. Panel A presents OLS results using alternative measures of density. Row 1 uses log density calculated at the county group level, except
in metropolitan areas, where it is calculated at the metropolitan area level. Row 2 uses log density calculated at the county group level, except
in metropolitan areas, where it is calculated as a weighted average of component county-group densities. Row 3 uses log density calculated at
the county group level, as a weighted average of component county densities. Row 4 uses log density calculated at the county group level, as a
weighted average of component census tract densities. Panel B contains results in which the density measures above are then used as instruments
for measurement error of the metro-level density. Instrument sets are indicated in the column headings. In Panel B.1, the last column uses the three
previous density measures as instruments. Panel B.2 displays the ﬁrst-stage results for the just-identiﬁed equations. In Panel C, the second and third
variables are, respectively, the log of own three-digit occupation or industry employment as a share of total metropolitan employment (computed

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 7: Occupation/industry switching among Displaced Workers, 1994-2002
Industry change
Occupation change No change Major Group Detailed Group
Panel A. All Displaced Workers
 No change -      -0.709    -1.971  **
-      (0.770) (0.941)
Major Group -1.811  ** -1.222  * -2.197  ***
(0.830) (0.733) (0.853)
Detailed Group -1.741  ** -1.485  ** -1.608   
(0.848) (0.748) (1.033)
Panel B. Plant Closing Sample
Occupation change No change Major Group Detailed Group
 No change -      -0.324    -2.308  *
-      (1.130) (1.329)
Major Group -2.428  * -2.323  * -2.463  *
(1.326) (1.226) (1.514)
Detailed Group -3.321  ** -2.383  * -1.962   
(1.408) (1.356) (2.286)
Notes: This table reports regression results using data from the CPS Displaced Worker Supplement, 1994-2002. Each entry displays the results
from a separate regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density (/100). The dependent variable is occupation change or industry
change after being displaced from a job, at the aggregation level indicated by row and column headings. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
metropolitan area/county group, are reported below in parentheses. Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are
marked with a ; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99% level, a ***. Panel A includes all workers who were displaced from their jobs; Panel B
includes only workers displaced by plant closings. Panel A: Number of observations of occupation-changing, 11,259; industry-changing, 11,274;
both occupation- and industry-changing, 11,211 Panel B: Number of observations of occupation-changing, 4,106; industry-changing, 4,116; both
occupation- and industry-changing, 4,089. Regressions include covariates as speciﬁed in column (5) of Table 2.
38Table 8: Density, Occupation/Industry Switching, and Employer Changes
(1) (2) (3)
Worker controls - X X
Metropolitan controls - - X
Panel A. Job Change as Dependent Variable
Log density (/100) -1.478  *** -1.559  *** -1.105  ***
(0.267) (0.259) (0.297)
Panel B. Control for Job Change
Log density (/100) -0.715  ** -0.731  ** -0.652  ***
(0.322) (0.300) (0.202)
Job change 0.434  *** 0.423  *** 0.386  ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes: This table reports regression results using data from the CPS Job-Tenure Supplement, 1994-2002. Each panel/column displays the results
from a separate regression. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area/county group, are reported below in parentheses. Coef-
ﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a ; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99% level, a ***.
The dependent variables are the following indicators: in Panel A, a change of 3-digit occupation or change; in Panel B, a change in employer.
Regressions include covariates as speciﬁed in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 2, respectively.
39Appendix A: Data Sources and Construction
This section provides detailed descriptions of data and methods used in the analysis of occupation and
industry switching.
A.1 Base data and sample restrictions
The base data set, as noted in the text, is the 1970 Form 1 Metro sample from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2004). This is a 1% random sample of the entire U.S. population. Two
features of the sample make the analysis possible. First, the sample identiﬁes geographic information to the
level of metropolitan area and county group. Second, it includes labor market information from both 1964
and 1969.
We restrict the sample to adults between the ages of 25 and 65. They must also have valid reported
industry or occupation data for both 1964 and 1969. This restriction varies the size of the sample depending
ontheoutcomevariable: forexample, iftheoutcomevariableisachangeinanindividual’sreportedindustry,
then the relevant restriction is valid industry information for both 1964 and 1969.
In addition, we exclude Alaska and Hawaii from our analysis.
A.2 Geography
The smallest geographic units identiﬁed in the 1970 census are metropolitan area (identiﬁed for those liv-
ing in metropolitan areas with populations greater than 100,000) and county group (identiﬁed for every
individual).
For individuals living in identiﬁed metropolitan areas, we take that to be the individual’s relevant la-
bor market. Some exceptions exist here. We combine certain neighboring metropolitan areas according
to census-deﬁned 1990 consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), which group metropolitan ar-
eas in close proximity. Note that the CMSA concept did not exist in 1970; however, these areas formed
uniﬁed labor markets. This procedure alters the following metropolitan areas (with absorbed MSAs in
parantheses): Boston (Brockton), Chicago (Gary), Cleveland (Akron, Lorain), Dallas (Fort Worth), Los An-
geles (Anaheim, Riverside-San Bernardino, Ventura), Miami (Fort Lauderdale), New York (Nassau-Suffolk,
40Bergen-Passaic, Jersey City, Newark), Philadelphia (Trenton, Wilmington), San Francisco (San Jose), and
Seattle (Tacoma).
For individuals not living in identiﬁed metropolitan areas, we use county group information to identify
their geographic location. County groups are analogous to the concept of Public Use Microdata Areas
(PUMAs) introduced in the 1990 census and are identiﬁed for the entire population. County groups again
consist of a central city and surrounding counties, with a minimum population of 250,000. In urban areas,
these groups might identify small sub-areas within metropolitan areas. In rural areas, where metropolitan
area is often not identiﬁed, county groups are much larger in area, frequently crossing state lines, but still
usually centered on the largest urban center in the area. Maps of 1970 county groups are available at the
IPUMS website (http://www.ipums.org/usa/volii/t1970maps.html).
Metropolitan and county-group aggregates are calculated based on data from the IPUMS. These ag-
gregates are population, the share of total workers with a college degree, the share of total workers in the
manufacturing sector, and the share of total workers in professional occupations.
Land area for metropolitan areas, used to calculate population density, is obtained from the Census
Bureau’s State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (1979).
Land area for county groups are obtained from The Historical United States County Boundary Files
(HUSCO) (Earle et al. 1999). HUSCO contains land area data for every U.S. county in 1970. These
data are matched with a county group composition (CGC) ﬁle available from the IPUMS website. The
CGC matches counties to the county group to which they belong. After this matching, we sum area across
counties to create land area data by county group. Future users of the CGC ﬁle should note that there are
a number of minor errors in the county group composition table, including missing county codes and the
misallocation of several Oklahoma counties to Maryland. Counties with missing county codes were matched
based on county name and state; Oklahoma counties were carefully re-allocated using the maps available on
the IPUMS website.
Additional regional controls are from the 1970 City and County Data Book (abbreviated as CCDB;
source: ICPSR, 1984). We match county data to the hybrid metropolitan area-county group regions used
in the analysis, taking weighted averages based on county population where appropriate. Demographic
data taken from the CCDB includes white and black population shares, percent changes in population, the
41component of population change due to net migration, and working-age and 65+ population shares. Data
on income/wealth and employment include low income shares, median income, rents, housing values, total
bank deposits, and the percent change in manufacturing value added from 1963 to 1967. Climate data
were constructed not from the CCDB, but from a geographic database (Oregon Climate Service, 2006) and
consist of the following variables: average maximum temperature in July, the average minimum temperature
in January, and the average dew point in July (a measure of humidity). We also include in the “climate”
variables the share of total retail receipts to the recreation sectors (taken from the CCDB), as a control
for consumption amenities. The population density (per square mile) in 1880 was computed from ICPSR
(1984).
In section 4.2.2, we describe adjusting our density measure in a number of ways. Population-weighted
averages of county group and county densities within our metropolitan area/county group hybrids use data
from HUSCO and the CGC. Population-weighted averages of tract densities use data from the CensusCD
(GeoLytics, 2001), a commercial product that contains tract population and tract shape ﬁles. We use the
mapping tools provided on the CD to calculate tract area from these shape ﬁles. Then, we take population-
weighted averages of tract densities within metropolitan areas and county groups. For the most part, only
metropolitan areas were tracted in 1970. This adjustment affects only these areas.
A.3 Occupation and Industry
The 1970 IPUMS contains information on individuals’ occupation and industry in both 1964 and 1969.
These occupations and industries are categorized using a three-digit scheme of the Census Bureau’s own
making. On its website, IPUMS lists detailed industry (http://www.ipums.org/usa/volii/97indus.html) and
occupation (http://www.ipums.org/usa/volii/97occup.html) codes.
We generate two-digit and one-digit occupation and industry codes by using contemporaneous census
classiﬁcations. One-digit occupational groups are (1) Professional and technical workers, (2) Managers
and administrators, (3) Sales workers, (4) Clerical workers, (5) Craftsmen, (6) Operatives, (7) Laborers,
(8) Farmers, (9) Service workers, and (10) Private household workers. One-digit industrial groups are (1)
Agriculture, mining, and construction, (2) Manufacturing, (3) Transportation, communications, and other
public utilities, (4) Wholesale and retail trade, (5) Finance, insurance, and real estate, (6) Entertainment,
42recreation, and professional services, and (7) Public administration. We use 38 two-digit occupations and
34 two-digit industries.
For 1969 occupation and industry, the universe consists of persons aged 14 and older who have worked
in the past 10 years, and who are not in the armed forces or new workers. The 1964 information is reported
for all persons aged 14 and older who were working at a job or business in 1964. Missing values for the
1969 data are coded as “N/A” or “Unemployed person, last worked in 1959 or earlier”; missing values for
the 1964 data include the additional category “Occupation not recorded.”
The 1970 IPUMS contains information on altered cases in a separate quality ﬂag variable. Separate
variables indicate whether the Census Bureau altered occupation, industry, lagged occupation, or lagged
industry information. However, in all cases, the allocation method is unspeciﬁed. These data are used in
Section 4.3 and Table 5.
43Appendix B: Probit Estimates for Occupation/Industry Switching, 1970 PUMS
Industry change
Occupation change No change Major Group Minor Group Detailed Group
 No change - -0.539  -0.785  -0.889 
- (0.096) (0.108) (0.113)
Major Group -0.762  -0.756  -0.805  -0.818 
(0.087) (0.105) (0.113) (0.114)
 Minor group -0.848  -0.817  -0.807  -0.755 
(0.094) (0.105) (0.110) (0.114)
Detailed Group -0.791  -0.714  -0.702  -0.667 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.129) (0.130)
Notes: Each entry reports the estimated marginal effects from a separate probit regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density
(/100). Dependent variable is occupation change or industry change between 1964 and 1969, at the aggregation level indicated by row and column
headings. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area/county group, are reported in parentheses. Number of observations of
occupation-changing, 516,854; industry-changing, 518,801, both occupation- and industry-changing, 509,643. Regressions include covariates as
speciﬁed in column (5) of Table 2. Estimating a model with occupation/industry ﬁxed effects was computationally infeasible in several cases, so
we instead de-meaned the independent variables prior to estimation and also include in the model the average switching rate by occupation/industry
cell instead of ﬁxed effects. (Results are quite similar to those from a ﬁxed-effects model in the subset of cases in which ﬁxed-effects estimation
was feasible.) All coefﬁcients in the table are statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence.
Appendix C: Add Controls for Unionization Rate, Displaced-Workers Sample, 1996-2002
(1) (2) (3)
Worker controls - X X
Metropolitan controls - - X
Log density (/100) -1.629  ** -1.543  ** -1.514  **
(0.703) (0.680) (0.643)
MSA labor force % -0.274  *** -0.258  *** -0.176  **
 in unions (0.070) (0.067) (0.072)
Notes: This table reports regression results using data from the CPS Displaced Worker Supplement, 1994-2002. Each entry displays the results from
a separate regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density (/100). The dependent variable is detailed occupation change after
being displaced from a job, with controls for the aggregate unionization rate. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on metropolitan area/county
group, are reported below in parentheses. Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a ; at the
95% level, a ; and at the 99% level, a ***. Regressions include covariates as speciﬁed in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 2, respectively.
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Professional and 0.333  -0.220    -0.467  *** -0.489  ***
 technical workers (0.471) (0.157) (0.147) (0.184)
Managers and 0.352  -0.097    -0.106    -0.074   
 administrators (0.478) (0.200) (0.184) (0.243)
Sales workers 0.856  -0.330  *** -0.319  *** -0.288  ***
(0.351) (0.080) (0.076) (0.105)
Clerical and 0.445  -0.642  *** -0.535  *** -0.335  *
 kindred workers (0.497) (0.158) (0.114) (0.192)
Craftsmen 0.348  -0.679  *** -0.651  *** -0.392  **
(0.476) (0.174) (0.163) (0.194)
Operatives 0.408  -1.350  *** -0.609  *** -0.743  ***
(0.491) (0.199) (0.215) (0.223)
Laborers 0.466  -1.531  *** -1.308  *** -1.293  ***
(0.499) (0.219) (0.193) (0.269)
Farmers 0.326  4.002  *** 3.696  *** 2.435  ***
(0.469) (0.515) (0.462) (0.730)
Service workers 0.351  -1.562  *** -1.733  *** -1.610  ***
(0.477) (0.362) (0.343) (0.290)
Private Household 0.280  -0.359    -0.363    -0.648   
 Workers (0.449) (0.302) (0.306) (0.547)
Notes: Each cell is a separate regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density (/100). Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a y; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99% level, a . Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
metropolitan area/county group, are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the change in detailed occupation or industry group. Column
0 contains the dependent variable mean (plus standard deviation in parentheses) for each category. Column 1 contains regressions with log density
and lagged industry and occupation dummies, as in column 1 of Table 2. Column 2 contains regressions with log density and individual controls,
as in column 3 of Table 2. Column 3 contains regressions with log density, individual, and aggregate controls, as in column 5 of Table 2.
45Appendix E: Decompositions by Major Industry Five Years Ago












Agriculture, mining 0.389  0.367    0.232    -0.063   
 construction (0.488) (0.251) (0.240) (0.227)
Manufacturing 0.424  -0.985  *** -0.432  *** -0.318  *
(0.494) (0.140) (0.136) (0.192)
Transportation, 0.353  -0.838  *** -0.831  *** -0.535  **
 Comm., Utilities (0.478) (0.175) (0.152) (0.244)
Wholesale and 0.562  -0.799  *** -0.755  *** -0.966  ***
 retail trade (0.496) (0.219) (0.170) (0.163)
Finance, Insurance, 0.399  -1.418  *** -1.446  *** -0.897  ***
 Real Estate (0.490) (0.312) (0.248) (0.314)
Services 0.343  -0.429  ** -0.663  *** -0.683  ***
(0.475) (0.169) (0.161) (0.147)
Public 0.329  -0.829  *** -0.992  *** -0.862  ***
 administration (0.470) (0.200) (0.196) (0.270)
Notes: Each cell is a separate regression. Cells contain estimates for the coefﬁcient on log density (/100). Coefﬁcients that are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 90% level of conﬁdence are marked with a y; at the 95% level, a ; and at the 99% level, a . Standard errors, adjusted for clustering on
metropolitan area/county group, are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the change in detailed occupation or industry group. Column
0 contains the dependent variable mean (plus standard deviation in parentheses) for each category. Column 1 contains regressions with log density
and lagged industry and occupation dummies, as in column 1 of Table 2. Column 2 contains regressions with log density and individual controls,
as in column 3 of Table 2. Column 3 contains regressions with log density, individual, and aggregate controls, as in column 5 of Table 2.
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Potential Experience
Notes: Each point displays the results from a separate regression whose dependent variable is the log hourly wage. The y axis measures the density
coefﬁcient from these regressions. The x axis is years of potential experience in the labor market. All regressions include dummies for gender,
race, marital status, citizenship, and years of education. The solid line is a smoothed version of the estimated coefﬁcients, produced using Stata’s
“lowess” procedure. The data are drawn from the 1970 census, and the sample and variables are constructed as described in Appendix A.
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Potential Experience
Notes: Each point displays the results from a separate regression whose dependent variable is an indicator variable for having changed employer in
the past year. The y axis measures the density coefﬁcient from these regressions. The x axis is years of potential experience in the labor market.
All regressions include dummies for gender, race, marital status, citizenship, and years of education. The solid line is a smoothed version of the
estimated coefﬁcients, produced using Stata’s “lowess” procedure. The data are drawn from the 1990s Job Tenure Supplements of the CPS, and the
sample and variables are constructed as described in Appendix A.
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